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Abstract
We use a laboratory experiment to study how perceptions of skill influence
teamwork. Our design is based on Gervais and Goldstein (2007) theory of
teams. Team output is increasing in skill and in effort, skill and effort are
complements, and workers’ effort choices are complements. An overconfident
agent thinks that his skill is higher than it actually is. We find that the
presence of overconfident workers in teams is beneficial for firms since it raises
effort provision and team output. We also find that overconfidence leads to
a Pareto improvement in workers’ payoffs. In contrast, underconfidence is
detrimental to firms as well as workers.
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1 Introduction
Teamwork has increased dramatically in many firms. Gordon (1992) reports
that 82% of companies with 100 or more employees declared they used team-
work and 68% of Fortune 1000 firms reported that they used self-managing
work teams in 1993 compared to 28% in 1987 (Lawler, Mohrman, and Led-
ford (1995)).1 Lazear and Shaw (2007) observe that from 1987 to 1996 the
share of large firms having more than 20% of employees organized in problem-
solving teams rose from 37% to 66% and that the percent of large firms with
workers in self-managed work teams rose from 27% to 78%.
One reason firms use teams is that team production can be more produc-
tive than individuals working alone. This happens when there are comple-
mentarities between the inputs (skills or efforts) of different workers. How-
ever, the realization of the potential of these synergistic benefits is not auto-
matic. The classic team model developed by Holmstro¨m (1982) shows that
workers have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of other team mem-
bers when effort choices are unobservable and team output is shared among
team members. Consequently, teamwork produces a social dilemma in which
individually rational decisions lead to inefficient social outcomes.
The experimental literature on public good provision and teamwork shows
that subjects in experiments do not systematically free-ride and that individ-
ual characteristics of team members–preferences, beliefs, and demographics–
lead to heterogeneity in team production (see Ivanova-Stenzel and Ku¨bler
(2005), Knez and Simester (2001), Lavy (2002) and Nalbantian and Schot-
ter (1997)). These results gave rise to various models based either on social
preferences or on norm enforcement through coercive devices or on specific
structures of the team production game.
Some people might not free-ride because they are not purely self-interested
but are also led by behavioral motivations like fairness or equity concerns:
they view free-riding as an unfair act that violates cooperative social norms
(Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000)). Altruist or
conditional cooperation can also lead people to provide higher effort levels
than the individually optimal ones (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr (2001)
and Sherstyuk et al. (2002)).
1These and other examples are reported in Cohen and Bailey (1997). Similarly, in
examining data of 56,000 U.S. production workers, Capelli and Rogovsky (1994) found
that one of the most common skills required by new work practices is the ability to work
in a team.
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Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest that peer pressure is a possible solution
to the free-riding problem in teams. If team members are able to monitor
one another and punish or ostracize those who fail to act cooperatively at
a sufficiently low cost, then more cooperative outcomes can be attained. It
could also be that people prefer not to free ride because of social approval
rather than fear of punishment (Falk and Ichino (2006)).
In a laboratory experiment Bornstein, Erev, and Galili (1993), Born-
stein, Erev, and Rozen (1990) and Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006)
compared the performance of two teams in a social dilemma situation facing
an intergroup competition. They found that teams competition significantly
increased the individual contributions of the teammates.
In this paper, we study experimentally the impact of individuals’ beliefs
about their skills on effort provision, team production, and payoffs. Indi-
viduals might abstain from free-riding in teams if they hold overly positive
perceptions of skill. If team output depends positively on skill and effort,
skill and effort are complements, and workers’ effort choices are comple-
ments, then effort provision is higher if workers believe that they are more
productive than they actually are.
Research in psychology shows that most people tend to overestimate
their skills. For instance, people overestimate their driving ability (Sven-
son (1981)), their managerial skills (Larwood and Whittaker (1977)), and
employees overestimate their job performance (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy
(1988) and Myers (1996)).
Laboratory and field studies like Burks et al. (2010), Clark and Friesen
(2009), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Grieco and Hogarth (2009), Hoelzl and
Rustichini (2005), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Moore and Cain (2007) and
Park and Santos-Pinto (2010) provide evidence that self-perceptions influence
behavior in economically relevant situations.
This judgment bias, called overconfidence in self-assessments of skill, has
been shown to have both costs and benefits. Smith (1976) suggests that over-
confidence explains gambling behavior and the decision to become a soldier.
Overconfidence is associated with excess market entry (Camerer and Lo-
vallo (1999)) and value-destroying mergers by CEOs (Malmendier and Tate
(2005)). In contrast, overconfidence can be beneficial if it improves motiva-
tion leading people to undertake more challenging projects and reach higher
performance levels (Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), Compte and Postlewaite
(2004), Taylor and Brown (1988) and Weinberg (2009)).
The impact of overconfidence on the employment relationship has been
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an active area of research. Hvide (2002) shows that a worker gains from over-
estimating his skill if that improves his bargaining power against the firm.
Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) show that if a firm is better informed about a
worker’s skill than the worker, if effort and self-confidence are complements,
then the firm has an incentive to boost the worker’s self-perception by of-
fering low-powered incentives that signal trust to the worker and increase
motivation. Gervais and Goldstein (2007) show theoretically that overconfi-
dence can reduce free-riding in teams. This result is driven by two effects:
the direct effect of overconfidence on own effort provision, and the strategic
effect of overconfidence of the team partner on a player’s effort provision.
They also show that if a team is composed of an unbiased and an overconfi-
dent worker, then overconfidence raises the payoff of the unbiased worker and
has an ambiguous effect on the payoff of the overconfident worker. Hence,
overconfidence can lead to a Pareto improvement of workers’ payoffs.2
This paper studies the impact of self-confidence on teamwork using a
laboratory experiment. We try to find answers to the following questions.
To what extent can overconfidence stimulate effort provision and reduce free-
riding in teams? Can overconfidence lead to a Pareto improvement of team
outcomes? Is there a strategic effect of overconfidence of the team partner
on a player’s effort provision?
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part, subjects perform
a skill task which consists in solving as many addition problems as they
can in five minutes. The second part starts first with a random matching
procedure in which the subject with the highest score in a matched pair is
assigned high-skill whereas the other subject is assigned low-skill. We then
elicit subjects’ beliefs about their own skill providing monetary incentives
for telling the truth. Comparing subjects’ beliefs with their actual skills,
we classify them into four groups: unbiased high-skill participants, unbiased
low-skill, underconfident, and overconfident. In the third and last part of
the experiment, subjects play the team game where they make simultaneous
effort choices. Each subject plays the team game once against 14 out of the
19 participants in the room. Before effort decisions are made, we remind
subjects of their beliefs about own skill and let them know the belief of skill
of each of the 14 team partners. This opens up the possibility that the
perception of skill of the team partner influences a subject’s effort choice.
2See also Andolfatto, Mongrain, and Myers (2009), Compte and Postlewaite (2004),
Fang and Moscarini (2005), Ko¨szegi (2006), Santos-Pinto (2010) and Santos-Pinto (2008).
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Our key results are as follows. All else equal, an overconfident participant
provides more effort than an unbiased low-skill participant. A participant
provides more effort when the team partner is overconfident than when the
team partner is unbiased low-skill. We find that overconfidence improves
team output. The output of low-skill teams with overconfident players is
higher than the output of low-skill teams with unbiased players. The output
of mixed-skill teams with one overconfident and one unbiased player is higher
than the output of mixed-skill teams with two unbiased players. Overconfi-
dence leads to a Pareto improvement of players’ payoffs since an overconfident
participant does not benefit or suffer from his bias and a participant’s pay-
off is higher when his team partner is overconfident rather than unbiased
low-skill. We find the opposite effects for underconfidence. Underconfidence
lowers effort provision, reduces team output and leads to a Pareto worsening
of players’ payoffs.
2 Theoretical Framework
The seminal contribution to the literature on teamwork and overconfidence
is Gervais and Goldstein (2007). They consider a model of teamwork where
team output is increasing in workers’ skills and effort choices. In this frame-
work, they hypothesize two kinds of complementarities: between effort and
ability for each worker, that is, the returns to higher effort of a high-skill
agent are greater than those of a low-skill agent; teammates’ efforts are com-
plements in production, that is, the returns to higher effort of an agent are
higher the greater the effort put in by the team partner.
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) consider a team composed by an overcon-
fident and an unbiased agent. The unbiased agent knows that the overcon-
fident agent is biased, the overconfident agent is unaware of his own bias,
knows that the unbiased agent thinks he is biased but disagrees with the
unbiased agent.
The first main finding in Gervais and Goldstein (2007) is that overcon-
fidence reduces underprovision of effort in teams. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. Since effort and skill are complements in production,
overconfidence makes higher effort more attractive to an overconfident agent.
Hence, there is a positive direct effect of overconfidence on the effort choice of
the overconfident agent. Additionally, since agents’ efforts are complements
in production, the higher effort of the overconfident agent makes higher ef-
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fort more valuable to the unbiased agent. In other words, the unbiased
agent works harder because he knows that the potential synergistic gains
from higher effort are higher with an overconfident team partner. Hence,
there is a positive strategic effect of overconfidence on the effort choice of the
unbiased agent.
The second main result in Gervais and Goldstein (2007) is that overcon-
fidence can give rise to a Pareto improvement in the sense that not only the
team and the unbiased agent are better off but also the overconfident agent
can be better off than if he had been unbiased. An overconfident worker’s
payoff decreases as he bears a cost due to his extra effort (direct effect of over-
confidence), but at the same time it increases as his partner also provides
more effort (strategic effect of overconfidence). In contrast, underconfidence
leads to a Pareto worsening since it reduces team output and the payoffs of
the unbiased and the underconfident teammates.
In Gervais and Goldstein (2007)’s team game there is complete infor-
mation since each agent places a probability equal to one on a particular
skill level. This assumption is not realistic for a laboratory experiment since
individuals are likely to have non-degenerate beliefs about their own skills.
Hence, in order to take their theoretical framework to an experimental proto-
col, we extend Gervais and Goldstein (2007)’s model by assuming that agent
i places probability qi ∈ [0, 1] on having high-skill, that is, agents have in-
complete information about their own skills. We now show that their results
also apply in this set-up.3
Let team output be given by
Q(e1, e2) = 2w(a1e1 + a2e2 + se1e2),
where ei is the level of effort of player i, ai is a random variable which
represents agent i’s skill and can take on two values {aL, aH} with 0 < aL <
aH , w > 0 and s > 0. Agents are risk neutral and have cost of effort
c(ei) = ce2i , where c > 0.
The ex-post payoff of agent i is the difference between half of the team
output and cost of effort of agent i:
Ui = w(aiei + ajej + seiej)− ce2i .
Denote the expected ability of agent i by E(ai) = a¯i = (1−pi)aL+piaH , where
pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability agent i has high ability, that is, pi = Pr(ai = aH).
3Gervais and Goldstein (2007)’s results are available in Appendix A.
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Agent i chooses effort to maximize his ex-ante expected payoff
Ep(Ui) = w(a¯iei + a¯jej + seiej)− ce2i .
The solution to this problem is ei =
w
2c(a¯i+sej). The solution concept for this
static game of incomplete information is Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE
from now on). The BNE effort level of agent i is
ei = 2
cw
d
a¯i +
sw2
d
a¯j. (1)
where d = 4c2 − s2w2 > 0 or s < 2c/w.
To introduce self-confidence we assume that the perceived expected ability
of agent i is E(Ai) = A¯i = (1 − qi)aL + qiaH where qi ∈ [0, 1] is agent i’s
belief that he has high ability, that is, qi = Pr(Ai = aH). Hence, agent i’s
self-perception bias is b¯i = A¯i− a¯i = (qi−pi)(aH−aL) ∈ [−aH+aL, aH−aL].
Agent i chooses effort to maximize his perceived ex-ante expected payoff
Eq(Ui) = w
[
A¯iei + a¯jej + se1e2
]− ce2i .
The solution to this problem is ei =
w
2c(A¯i + sej). The BNE effort of agent i
as a function of agents’ perceived expected abilities is given by
ei = 2
cw
d
A¯i +
sw2
d
A¯j. (2)
The hypothesis that we will test first is whether effort choices are consistent
with perceived expected abilities.
Hypothesis 0: Players’ effort choices are consistent with their beliefs.
The BNE effort of agent i as a function of agents’ expected abilities and
self-perception biases is obtained from (2) by replacing A¯i and A¯j by a¯i + b¯i
and a¯j + b¯j, respectively:
ei = 2
cw
d
a¯i +
sw2
d
a¯j + 2
cw
d
b¯i +
sw2
d
b¯j. (3)
From (3) we can derive hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.
Hypothesis 1: (a) There is a positive direct effect of the skill of player i on
his own effort; (b) There is a positive strategic effect of the skill of player j
on the effort of player i.
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When agent i is overconfident, b¯i > 0, an increase in overconfidence of
agent i raises the effort of agent i. In contrast, when agent i is underconfident,
b¯i < 0, an increase in underconfidence of agent i reduces the effort of agent
i.
Hypothesis 2: (a) There is a positive direct effect of overconfidence of player
i on his own effort; (b) There is a negative direct effect of underconfidence
of player i on his own effort.
When agent j is overconfident, b¯j > 0, an increase in overconfidence of
agent j raises the effort of agent i. In contrast, when agent j is underconfi-
dent, b¯j < 0, an increase in underconfidence of agent j reduces the effort of
agent i.
Hypothesis 3: (a) There is a positive strategic effect of overconfidence of
player j on the effort of player i; (b) There is a negative strategic effect of
underconfidence of player j on the effort of player i.
Our next results concern the impact of biased beliefs on team output.
Using the equilibrium effort levels e1 and e2 determined by (3), the ex-post
team output is
Q(b¯1, b¯2) = 2w
[
a1e1(b¯1, b¯2) + a2e2(b¯1, b¯2) + se1(b¯1, b¯2)e2(b¯1, b¯2)
]
. (4)
Differentiating (4) with respect to b¯1 and b¯2 we obtain:
∂Q
∂b¯1
db¯1 +
∂Q
∂b¯2
db¯2 = 2w
[
(a1 + se2)
∂e1
∂b¯1
+ (a2 + se1)
∂e2
∂b¯1
]
db¯1
+ 2w
[
(a1 + se1)
∂e1
∂b¯2
+ (a2 + se2)
∂e2
∂b¯2
]
db¯2.
From (3) we have if b¯i > 0 and b¯j > 0, then
∂ei
∂b¯i
> 0 and ∂ei
∂b¯j
> 0. Hence, when
both team members are overconfident, an increase in overconfidence increases
team output. Obviously, the reverse happens when both team members are
underconfident.
Hypothesis 4: (a) Team output is increasing with an increase in overcon-
fidence of the team members; (b) Team output is decreasing with a increase
in underconfidence of the team members.
Finally, our next results concern the impact of biased beliefs on players’
ex-post payoffs (the results are derived in Appendix B). Regarding the im-
pact of biased beliefs on the ex-post payoffs of unbiased agents, we have the
following results.
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Hypothesis 5: (a) The ex-post payoff of an unbiased agent is increasing with
an increase in overconfidence of the team partner; (b) The ex-post payoff of
an unbiased agent is decreasing with an increase in underconfidence of the
team partner.
Furthermore, regarding the impact of biased beliefs on the ex-post payoffs
of biased agents, we have the following results.
Hypothesis 6: (a) The ex-post payoff of an overconfident agent, in a team
with an unbiased agent, is increasing in overconfidence if and only if over-
confidence is sufficiently small; (b) The ex-post payoff of an underconfident
agent, in a team with an unbiased agent, is decreasing in underconfidence.
3 Design of the Experiment
Our experiment consists of two main treatments called “Belief” and “Type
and Belief” and each treatment is divided into three successive parts. For
each treatment, our behavioral predictions are based on the analysis of the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, as it is characterized in the Section 2. We set
w = 3, s = 5/12, and c = 1.5. Low-skill subjects have a marginal productiv-
ity of 3 (aL = 3) and high-skill subjects of 7 (aH = 7).
The experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Lyon
(GATE). They were run in a computerized way using Regate-NG as ex-
perimental software. 120 subjects were recruited from the undergraduate
population at the Management School of Lyon and an engineering school,
E´cole Centrale de Lyon. Three sessions, each involving 20 participants, were
conducted for each of two treatments. Each subject participated in a single
session. Details on the experimental design are provided in Appendix C.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects are randomly assigned to a com-
puter. The written instructions are then distributed and read aloud; so that
it is common information that everybody is involved in the same experiment.
At the end, subjects are privately paid their earnings, calculated according
to the conversion rate 35 points are equal to 1 Euro. A show-up fee of 2
Euros is added. Each session lasted around 75 minutes and mean earnings
are approximately 17 Euros.
From the beginning, subjects are explicitly told that the experiment is
divided into three parts. The instructions corresponding to each part are
distributed and read just before the part starts. This procedure prevents
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us from behavior in one part being affected by the rules of the subsequent
one(s) and by some behavioral expectations.
The first part of the experiment consists of a skill task. Subjects have
five minutes to solve a series of addition problems. A correct answer gives
a subject 2 points and a wrong answer 0 point. Before performing the task,
subjects are allowed to practice it during one minute and are informed that
the number of correct answers and the speed at which they complete the task
will, amongst other factors, determine how easy it is for them to obtain some
points later in the experiment. This increases the incentives to perform well
in the skill task without increasing the cost of the experiment. Subjects are
told neither their score on the skill task nor the earnings until the end of the
experimental session.
The second part of the experiment starts with a matching protocol: a
computer program randomly matches subjects into pairs and compares the
scores of subjects in each pair (from the first part). The subject who got the
highest score in each pair is assigned to a high type and the other one to a
low type. If both subjects in a pair have the same score, the answer time
breaks the tie (the fastest participant is assigned the high type). After this
matching, subjects’ beliefs about their own type are elicited: each subject is
asked to report the type he believes he is. Each subject is paid 5 Euros for
making an accurate forecast and 0 Euro otherwise. The monetary payment
for making a correct guess implies that if a subject thinks that he has more
than 50% probability of being a high type, then his self-assessment should be
of high type. Note that at this stage subjects do not know that their beliefs
about skill will play a critical role in the team game since the instructions to
the third part of the experiment are only distributed after the second part is
over.
The third part of the experiment consists of the team game. This part of
the experiment involves two information treatments. In treatment “Belief,”
each subject is told privately the stated belief of each team partner. In
treatment “Type and Belief,” each subject is told privately the stated belief
and the type of each team partner. In other words, in treatment “Belief”
subjects only know the partner’s self-evaluation whereas in treatment “Type
and Belief” they know both the partner’s type and self-evaluation. From the
theoretical point of view, these two treatments are equivalent because each
individual’s equilibrium effort decision is based only on his own and the team
partner’s beliefs.
We use a stranger matching design where each subject plays the team
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game once against 14 out of the 19 other participants in the room.4 In
each of the 14 games, subjects choose an effort level simultaneously and
independently among four possible values 6, 8, 10 or 12. Subjects do not
receive any feedback from one decision to another to rule out learning effects.
Last, subjects are told that only one decision out of the 14 will determine
earnings regarding effort choices. That decision is randomly drawn at the
end of the experiment. This rules out wealth and portfolio effects.
In order to make their decisions, subjects are given a sheet of paper with
four payoff matrices, one for each of the four possible types of pairs of player
combinations. Each payoff matrix displays the players’ payoffs for the 16
possible pairs of effort combinations.5 In order to improve subjects’ under-
standing of the team game, subjects are requested to complete some exercises
with the payoff matrices. The experimentalist checked the answers and re-
explained the game in private in case a subject’s answers indicated lack of
understanding of the game. Instructions are kept as neutral as possible as
regards to a teamwork context. The high- and low-type subjects are pre-
sented as “Type A” and “Type B” participants. The words “coefficient” and
“number” are used instead of “marginal productivity of effort” and “effort
choice”.
After completing the third part of the experiment, subjects are told their
type, the type of the partner, the effort choices, and the earnings for the
randomly drawn effort decision. They are also told their earnings in the skill
task and self-assessment of skill. The participants are then asked to answer
a questionnaire providing their individual characteristics (gender, age, etc.).
Subjects in our sample are briefly described in Table 1.
insert Table 1 here
4 Findings
In this section we present the main findings of the experiment.
4The algorithm that determines team compositions ensures that each subject plays
against 7 high-skill partners and 7 low-skill partners. This information was not provided
to the subjects.
5See the end of instructions in Appendix C.
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4.1 Self-Confidence
To describe self-confidence in our sample we divide subjects into four groups
according to their actual skills (low or high) and their beliefs about skill
(biased or unbiased).
A subject who makes a correct self-evaluation of skill is called unbiased
whereas a subject who makes an incorrect self-evaluation of skill is called bi-
ased. A low-skill subject who states he has high-skill is called overconfident
and a high-skill subject who states he has low-skill is called underconfident.
We take no stand here whether the observed biases (overconfidence and un-
derconfidence) are rational or irrational. For a discussion of rational and
irrational self-confidence biases see Benoˆıt and Dubra (2011).
Table 2 displays the number and the proportion of players in each group
for the full sample, treatment “Belief” and treatment “Type and Belief”.
insert Table 2 here
Table 2 shows that approximately 55% of subjects are unbiased whereas
45% display self-confidence biases. Additionally, we see that overconfidence
is more frequent in our sample than underconfidence: 27% of players are over-
confident and only 18% are underconfident. A test of proportions shows there
are significantly more overconfident subjects among low-skill players than un-
derconfident subjects among high-skill players (p = 0.066). Distinguishing
the treatments “Belief” and “Type and Belief”, we observe almost the same
distributions. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of the distribu-
tions confirms that the proportion of subjects in each of the four groups does
not differ significantly from one treatment to another (p = 1.000).
4.2 Play of BNE
For the chosen team game parameterization, we can compute the BNE effort
choices for all possible combinations of beliefs (q1, q2) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1]. However,
we don’t observe the exact qi of each subject since we just ask subjects if they
think they are high or low type. Additionally, effort choices are constrained
to belong to the set {6, 8, 10, 12}. Taking this into consideration, Table 3
displays the set of BNE effort levels consistent with players’ beliefs about
skill, Γ(q1, q2).
insert Table 3 here
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A team plays a BNE when the players’ effort choices belong to the set of
equilibrium effort levels consistent with players’ beliefs, Γ(q1, q2). The per-
centage of teams that play a BNE as a function of team composition in terms
of players’ skills and beliefs is displayed in Table 4.
insert Table 4 here
We can see from Table 4 that approximately half of the teams in our
sample plays a BNE. This result is consistent with experimental evidence
which shows that in strategic settings without clear precedents, individuals’
initial responses often deviate systematically from equilibrium and that there
is substantial heterogeneity in strategic sophistication.6
Table 4 also shows that compliance with equilibrium varies with team
composition. High-skill teams (two high-skill players) play an equilibrium
in 60% of cases, mixed-skill teams (a low- and a high-skill player) play an
equilibrium in 51% of cases, and low-skill teams (two low-skill players) play
an equilibrium in 44% of cases. A test of proportions shows that high-skill
teams have a higher compliance rate with equilibrium than low-skill teams
(p = 0.001) and mixed-skill teams (p = 0.036) but the compliance rates of
low- and mixed-skill teams are not significantly different (p = 0.102).
Unbiased teams play an equilibrium in 62% of cases. In contrast, biased
teams (those where at least one player has biased beliefs) do it only in 47%
of cases (62% is different from 47% at 1% significance level). Teams where
both players are underconfident play an equilibrium in 55% of cases but
teams where both players are overconfident only do it in 37.5% of cases.
Teams where one player is unbiased and the other overconfident play an
equilibrium in 52% of cases, and those where one player is unbiased and the
other underconfident do it in 41% of cases.
Result 0: 52% of teams play effort levels which are consistent with players’
beliefs about skill. The compliance rate with BNE varies with team com-
position: it is increasing with players’ skills, but decreasing with players’
self-confidence biases.
4.3 Effort Choices
In the experiment, each player makes 14 effort decisions that are constrained
to belong to the set {6, 8, 10, 12}. The information provided to the play-
6See Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001),
Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995).
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ers about their partners’ actual skill differs from one treatment to another,
but the players always know their partners’ beliefs. Taking this into consid-
eration, Table 5 displays the distribution of effort choices as a function of
players’ skill and belief, and partners’ belief.
insert Table 5 here
Table 5 shows that, conditional on the partner’s belief, the distribution
of effort choices of overconfident players first-order stochastically dominates
that of unbiased low-skill players. In contrast, the distribution of effort
choices of underconfident players is first-order stochastically dominated by
that of unbiased high-skill players. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equal-
ity of the distributions confirm that the distributions of effort choices differ
significantly between overconfident and unbiased low-skill players, whatever
partner’s belief is (p < 0.0001). We also find significant differences when
we compare the effort distributions of unbiased and underconfident high-skill
players (p < 0.0001).
Table 5 also shows that, conditional on a player’s skill and belief, players
choose higher effort levels when their team partners have a high belief of skill
than when the team partners have a low belief.
The effort choice of a subject who plays an equilibrium is determined
by his own perception of skill and that of his team partner, Ai and Aj,
respectively, according to (2). Therefore, to show that beliefs about skill
have an impact on effort we estimate the ordered probit model:
e∗ij = α1Ai + α2Aj + αzzi + εij, (5)
where e∗ij is a latent continuous variable that represents the effort of player i
when player j is the team partner, eij, the observed ordinal variable, takes on
values 6, 8, 10 or 12, i = 1, ..., 120, and, for each i there are 14 different team
partners j. The variable Ai takes the value of 1 when player i believes to have
high-skill and 0 otherwise, and Aj takes the value of 1 when player j believes
to have high-skill and 0 otherwise. The variable zi is a vector of control
variables of player i that includes gender, age, marital status, student status,
years of education, field of study, children, years of education of father, years
of education of mother, and previous participation in experiments. Finally,
we cluster standard errors at the subject level.
When subjects make their effort choices they do not know their actual
skill, ai and, in treatment “Belief,” they also don’t know the actual skill
of the team partner, aj. However, at the end of the experiment we know
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subjects’ actual skills, ai and aj, and self-perception biases, bi and bj, and
we can use that information to decompose the impact of perceptions of skill
on effort using (3). Thus, to show that self-confidence biases have an impact
on effort we estimate the ordered probit model:
e∗ij = β1ai + β2aj + β3b1i + β4b2i + β5b1j + β6b2j + βzzi + εij, (6)
where ai takes the value of 1 when player i has high-skill and 0 otherwise,
and aj takes the value of 1 when player j has high-skill and 0 otherwise.
The variables b1i, b2i, b1j, and b2j capture self-confidence of players i and
j. The variable b1i takes the value of 1 when player i is overconfident and
0 otherwise, and b2i takes the value of 1 if player i is underconfident and 0
otherwise. The omitted category, to which b1i and b2i are compared, refers
to the case when player i has a correct assessment of skill. The variable
b1j takes the value of 1 when player j is overconfident and 0 otherwise, and
b2j takes the value of 1 if player j is underconfident and 0 otherwise. The
omitted category, to which b1j and b2j are compared, refers to the case when
player j has a correct assessment of skill.7
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equations (5) and (6).
insert Table 6 here
We see from Table 6 that the estimates for α1 and α2 are both positive
and significant, that is, a player’s effort is increasing with own belief about
skill and with the team partner’s belief. The estimate for α1 is significantly
greater than that for α2. This is consistent with (2) and the assumption
s < 2c/w which imply that the impact of a player’s belief about skill on own
effort is greater than the impact of the team partner’s belief.
We also see from Table 6 that we find support for a positive direct ef-
fect of the skill of a player on effort (hypothesis 1a). The estimate for β1 is
positive and significant which indicates that, on average, a high-skill player
provides more effort than a low-skill player. We also find support for a posi-
tive strategic effect of the skill of the team partner on own effort (hypothesis
1b). The estimate for β2 is positive and significant which indicates that, on
7This specification implies that ai and b1i are negatively correlated (a high-skill player
cannot be overconfident) and that ai and b2i are positively correlated (a low-skill player
cannot be underconfident). Similarly, aj and b1j are negatively correlated and aj and b2j
are positively correlated. These correlations do not bias the estimates but generate large
standard errors. The large standard errors make it harder to find statistically significant
effects of self-confidence biases on effort.
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average, a player provides more effort when the team partner has high-skill
than when the team partner has low-skill.
Result 1: (a) All else equal, a high-skill player provides more effort than
a low-skill player; (b) All else equal, a player provides more effort when the
team partner has high-skill than when the team partner has low-skill.
We find support for a positive direct effect of own overconfidence on effort
(hypothesis 2a). On average, overconfident players provide more effort than
unbiased low-skill players since the estimate for β3 is positive and significant.
We also find support for a negative direct effect of own underconfidence on
effort (hypothesis 2b). On average, underconfident players provide less effort
than unbiased high-skill players since the estimate for β4 is negative and
significant.
Result 2: (a) All else equal, overconfident players provide more effort than
unbiased low-skill players; (b) All else equal, underconfident players provide
less effort than unbiased high-skill players.
Finally, we find support for a positive strategic effect of overconfidence
of the team partner on own effort (hypothesis 3a). The estimate for β5 is
positive and significant which indicates that, on average, a player provides
more effort when the team partner is overconfident than when the team part-
ner is unbiased low-skill. We also find support for a negative strategic effect
of underconfidence of the team partner on own effort (hypothesis 3b). The
estimate for β6 is negative and significant which indicates that, on average,
a player provides less effort when the team partner is underconfident than
when the team partner is unbiased high-skill.
Result 3: (a) All else equal, a player provides more effort when the team
partner is overconfident than when the team partner is unbiased low-skill;
(b) All else equal, a player provides less effort when the team partner is
underconfident than when the team partner is unbiased high-skill.
Including the control variables the effects persist. All effects are signifi-
cant at 1%, except the strategic effect of overconfidence of the team partner
on a player’s effort, which is significant at 10%. The only significant control
variables are age and gender: all else equal, older subjects put in less effort
than younger ones and women put in less effort than men.8
8The absolute values of the estimates for β1, β3 and β4 are not significantly differ-
ent from the estimate for α1. Additionally, the absolute values of the estimates for β2
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4.4 Team Output
To analyze the impact of self-confidence on team output we divide teams
into groups according to the skills of the team members: high-skill teams
(two high-skill players), mixed-skill teams (one high-skill and one low-skill
player), and low-skill teams (two low-skill players). These three types of
teams are further divided into subgroups according to players’ beliefs about
skill leading to a total of 10 different team compositions.
Table 7 displays the mean team output of each team composition.
insert Table 7 here
The second column in Table 7 shows that the mean team output of low-
skill teams increases with the number of overconfident players. The mean
team output of a low-skill team with two overconfident players (563) is greater
than that of a low-skill team with one unbiased and one overconfident player
(538) which, in turn, is greater than the mean team output of a low-skill
team with two unbiased players (422).
The fourth column shows that the mean team output of a mixed-skill
team with one unbiased and one underconfident player (664) is smaller than
the mean team output of a mixed-skill team with two unbiased players (792)
which, in turn, is smaller than the mean team output of a mixed-skill team
with one unbiased and one overconfident player (890).
Finally, the sixth column shows that the mean team output of high-skill
teams decreases with the number of underconfident players. The mean team
output of a high-skill team with two underconfident players (882) is smaller
than that of a high-skill team with one unbiased and one underconfident
player (986) which, in turn, is smaller than the mean team output of a high-
skill team with two unbiased players (1231).
To show that overconfidence has an impact on the output of low-skill
teams we estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares:
QLi = β
L
0 + β
L
1 Two Overi + β
L
2 One Overi + β
L
3 zi + εi, (7)
where the dependent variable QLi denotes the ex-post output of a low-skill
team. The variable Two Overi takes the value 1 if a low-skill team has two
and β6 are not significantly different from the estimate for α2 but the estimate for β5 is
marginally significantly different from the estimate for α2 (p = 0.0436). These results are
consistent with the decomposition of players’ beliefs about skill into actual skill and over-
and underconfidence biases in (3).
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overconfident players and 0 otherwise. The variable One Overi takes the
value 1 if a low-skill team has only one overconfident player and 0 otherwise.
The variable zi consists of a vector team demographics including team age
(the sum of ages of players), team education (the sum of years of education of
players), team mothers’ education (the sum of years of education of players’
mothers), team fathers’ education (the sum of years of education of players’
fathers), and dummies for team gender composition, marital status, student
status, field of study, children and previous participation in an experiment.9
The second and third columns of Table 8 report the estimates for the
coefficients in (7) without and with team demographics, respectively.
insert Table 8 here
We start by discussing the results obtained without controls. We find
that the output of a low-skill team with two overconfident players is greater
than that of a low-skill team with two unbiased players since the estimate
for βL1 is positive and significant. We also find that the output of a low-skill
team with only one overconfident player is greater than that of a low-skill
team with two unbiased players since the estimate for βL2 is positive and
significant. All effects are significant at 1%.
Including the control variables the effects persist. The only significant
control variable (only at 10%) for low-skill teams is marital status: all else
equal, a low-skill team where only one of the players is married produces
lower output than a low-skill team where both players are single.
We use a similar approach to show that underconfidence has an impact
9More precisely, dummies are defined as follows. “Mixed gender” is equal to 1 if the
team includes only one female and 0 otherwise, while “Female gender” is equal to 1 if
the team includes two females. The reference category for team gender composition is
teams with two males. Regarding marital status, “One married player” is 1 if only one
of the players is married and 0 otherwise, and “Two married players” is 1 if both players
are married and 0 otherwise. The reference category is teams with two single players.
“Student” is 1 if both players are student and 0 otherwise. The reference category is
teams that include at most one student. “No student in economics” is 1 if none of both
players studies economics and management, while “One student in economics” is 1 if only
one of the players studies economics and management. The reference category is teams
with two students in economics and management. “Child” is 1 if one or both players
have at least one child and 0 otherwise. The reference category is teams that include
two players without any child. “Participation in experiment” is equal to 1 if both players
previously participated in an experiment and 0 otherwise. The reference category is teams
that include at least one player who never participated in an experiment.
18
on the output of high-skill teams:
QHi = β
H
0 + β
H
1 Two Underi + β
H
2 One Underi + β
H
3 zi + εi, (8)
where the dependent variable QHi denotes the ex-post output of a high-skill
team, Two Underi takes the value 1 if a high-skill team has two undercon-
fident players and 0 otherwise, and the variable One Underi takes the value
1 if a high-skill team has only one underconfident player and 0 otherwise.
The two last columns of Table 8 report the estimates for the coefficients
in (8) without and with team demographics, respectively.
We find that the output of a high-skill team with two underconfident
players is smaller than that of a high-skill team with two unbiased players
since the estimate for βH1 is negative and significant. We also find that the
output of a high-skill team with only one underconfident player is smaller
than that of a high-skill team with two unbiased players since the estimate
for βH2 is negative and significant. All effects are significant at 1%.
Including the control variables the effects persist. The only significant
control variables for high-skill teams are the sum of years of education of
players and the sum of years of education of players’ fathers (both at 5%):
all else equal, high-skill teams with more educated players produce higher
output and so do high-skill teams whose players have more educated fathers.
To show that self-confidence has an impact on the output of mixed-skill
teams we estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares:
QMi = β
M
0 +β
M
1 One Underi+β
M
2 One Overi+β
M
3 Two Biasedi+β
M
4 zi+ εi,
(9)
where the dependent variable QMi denotes the ex-post output of a mixed-skill
team. The variable One Overi takes the value 1 if a mixed-skill team has
one overconfident and one unbiased player. The variable One Underi takes
the value 1 if a mixed-skill team has one underconfident and one unbiased
player. The variable Two Biasedi takes the value 1 if a mixed-skill team is
composed by one underconfident and one overconfident player.
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 8 report the estimates for the
coefficients in (9) without and with team demographics, respectively.
We find that the output of a mixed-skill team with one underconfident
and one unbiased player is smaller than that of a mixed-skill team with two
unbiased players since the estimate for βM1 is negative and significant. We
also find that the output of a mixed-skill team with one overconfident and one
unbiased player is higher than that of a mixed-skill team with two unbiased
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players since the estimate for βM2 is positive and significant. Finally, we find
that the output of a mixed-skill team with two biased players is lower than
that of a mixed-skill team with two unbiased players since the estimate for
βM3 is negative and significant. All effects are significant at 1%.
Including the control variables the effects persist. For mixed-skill teams
we find the following significant control variables: team gender composition,
team age, and team marital status. All else equal, mixed-skill teams with two
females produce lower output than mixed-skill teams with two males (at 1%).
All else equal, mixed-skill teams with only one female produce lower output
than mixed-skill teams with two males (at 5%). All else equal, mixed-skill
teams with older players produce less output and mixed skill teams where
only one of the players is married produce less output than mixed-skill teams
where both players are single (both at 5%).
Result 4: (a) The output of low-skill teams increases with overconfidence of
the team members; (b) The output of high-skill teams decreases with under-
confidence of the team members; (c) The output of mixed-skill teams with one
overconfident and one unbiased player is higher than the output of mixed-skill
teams with two unbiased players which, in turn, is higher than the output of
mixed-skill teams with one underconfident and one unbiased player.
Hence, for any team skill composition (low-skill, mixed-skill and high-
skill), we find that mean team output increases with the number of over-
confident players and decrease with the number of underconfident players.
These results support hypotheses 4a and 4b.
4.5 Players’ Payoffs
Let us now turn to the impact of self-confidence on players’ payoffs. Table
9 displays the mean payoff of subjects as a function of their own and their
partners’ skill and belief.
insert Table 9 here
We can see from Table 9 that, comparing a player’s payoff when the part-
ner is unbiased to a player’s payoff when the partner is overconfident, having
an overconfident team partner is beneficial (hypothesis 5a). In contrast, hav-
ing an underconfident team partner reduces one’s payoff (hypothesis 5b).
Table 9 also shows us that the mean payoff of an overconfident player
is approximately equal to the mean payoff of an unbiased low-skill player,
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except when the team partner is underconfident. This suggests that the
negative direct effect of overconfidence on an overconfident player’s payoff
more or less compensates the positive strategic effect.
Table 9 also shows us that the mean payoff of an underconfident player
is substantially lower than the mean payoff of an unbiased high-skill player,
except when the team partner is underconfident. This is consistent with the
negative direct and strategic effects of underconfidence on the payoff of an
underconfident player (hypothesis 6b).
To show that self-confidence has an impact on players’ payoffs we estimate
the following equation by ordinary least squares:
Uij = β0 + β1ai + β2aj + β3b1i + β4b2i + β5b1j + β6b2j + βzzi + εij, (10)
where the dependent variable Uij denotes the ex-post payoff of player i when
player j is the team partner. The other variables are the same as in (6).
Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
The estimates for the coefficients in (10) are reported in Table 10.
insert Table 10 here
We start by discussing the results obtained without controls. We find
that, on average, the payoff of a high-skill player is greater than that of a
low-skill player since the estimate for β1 is positive and significant. We also
find that, on average, the payoff of a player is greater when the team partner
has high-skill than when the team partner has low-skill since the estimate
for β2 is positive and significant.
We find support for a positive strategic effect of overconfidence of the
team partner on own payoff (hypothesis 5a). The estimate for β5 is pos-
itive and significant which indicates that, on average, a player’s payoff is
greater when the team partner is overconfident than when the team partner
is unbiased low-skill. We also find support for a negative strategic effect of
underconfidence of the team partner on own payoff (hypothesis 5b). The
estimate for β6 is negative and significant which indicates that, on average, a
player’s payoff is lower when the team partner is underconfident than when
the team partner is unbiased high-skill.
Result 5: (a) All else equal, the ex-post payoff of a player increases with
overconfidence of the team partner; (b) All else equal, the ex-post payoff of a
player decreases with underconfidence of the team partner.
We find that the estimate for β3 is not significantly different from zero
which indicates that, on average, the payoff of an overconfident player is equal
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to that of an unbiased low-skill player. This result is consistent with hypoth-
esis 6a even though we cannot distinguish between low and high overconfi-
dence levels. Overconfidence has a negative direct effect on an overconfident
player’s payoff since it leads to an optimization loss (an overconfident player
maximizes the perceived payoff function not the actual one) but a positive
strategic effect since it raises the effort of the team partner. If the two effects
cancel out, then overconfidence has no impact on an overconfident player’s
payoff.
We also find that the estimate for β4 is negative and significant which
indicates that, on average, the payoff of an underconfident player is lower
than that of an unbiased high-skill player (hypothesis 6b). Underconfidence
has a negative direct effect on an underconfident player’s payoff due to an
optimization loss and also a negative strategic effect since it lowers the effort
of the team partner.
Result 6: (a) All else equal, overconfidence has no significant impact on
an overconfident player’s ex-post payoff; (b) All else equal, underconfidence
reduces the ex-post payoff of an underconfident player.
Including the control variables the effects persist. All effects are signif-
icant at 1%, except the impact of own overconfidence on payoff, which is
insignificant. The only significant control variables are age, marital status
and years of education: all else equal, older subjects attain higher payoffs
than younger ones, single subjects attain higher payoffs than those who live
in a couple, and subjects with more years of education attain higher payoffs
than those with less.
4.6 Information Treatments
The team game includes two treatments that differ in the information pro-
vided to the subjects about their team partners. In treatment “Belief”, sub-
jects are only told their partners’ subjective belief about skill. In treatment
“Type and Belief”, subjects are told their partners’ subjective belief about
skill and actual skill. For a subject who plays an equilibrium effort level, the
only relevant information about the partner that the subject needs to make
an effort choice is the partner’s belief. So, in treatment “Type and Belief”
knowing the type of the partner should not matter for the effort decision of a
subjects who plays according to equilibrium. Therefore we expect behavior
to be the same across the two information treatments. We now summarize
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the findings obtained when we analyze effort choices and payoffs in the two
information treatments (the estimations are available upon request).
Result 7: (a) There is support for positive direct and strategic effects of
overconfidence on effort in treatment “Belief” but not in “Type and Belief”;
(b) There is support for negative direct and strategic effects of underconfi-
dence on effort in both treatments; (c) The impact of self-confidence biases
on players’ payoffs is the same in the two treatments and follows hypotheses
5 and 6; (d) 58% of teams play a BNE in treatment “Belief” but only 46%
of teams do it in “Type and Belief”.
The fact that we find support for the existence of positive direct and
strategic effects of overconfidence in treatment “Belief” but not in treat-
ment “Type and Belief” is driven by differences in the percentage of teams
that play a BNE across the two treatments. Whereas 58% of teams play a
BNE in treatment “Belief” only 46% of teams do it in treatment “Type and
Belief”–this difference is significant at 1% (p = 0.0006). Moreover, restricting
attention to teams where at least one player is overconfident, the difference is
even larger: 62% of those teams play a BNE in treatment “Belief” and only
38% do that in treatment “Type and Belief” (p < 0.0001). The low effort
levels provided by overconfident players who do not play a BNE explains
this difference in behavior observed in treatments “Belief” and “Type and
Belief.”
5 Discussion
Our results show self-confidence influences effort provision in teams. Over-
confidence increases effort provision which reduces moral hazard problems in
teams. In contrast, underconfidence lowers effort provision. Both effects de-
rive from the assumption that effort and skill are complements in production
and the assumption that players’ effort choices are strategic complements.
The positive direct effect of overconfidence on effort provision derives
from the assumption that skill and effort are complements in production. If
skill and effort are substitutes, then there could be a negative direct effect of
overconfidence on effort provision.
Our findings would be strengthened if the marginal disutility of effort is
decreasing in skill, that is, if high-skill players bear a lower cost of effort than
low-skill players at any given effort level. As Gervais and Goldstein (2007)
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point out, this assumption is made in many models that allow for skill hetero-
geneity like signaling (Spence (1973)), rank-order tournaments (Lazear and
Rosen (1981)), screening (Garen (1985)) or multi-period contracting (Lewis
and Sappington (1997)).
The positive strategic effect of overconfidence of player i on the effort
of player j derives from the assumption of complementarities between team
partners’ efforts which is natural in a teamwork model. If there are no com-
plementarities in effort choices, then the strategic effect of self-confidence
would not exist since each player would choose his effort level regardless
of team partner’s effort. As Alchian and Demsetz (1972) point out, firms
are set up in order to make the most of positive externalities and comple-
mentarities between workers. Without complementarities in effort choices,
teamwork is unlikely to be used as management practice because it leads to
lower production level than individual work.
Social preferences have been shown to influence players’ contributions in
public good provision experiments. Peer pressure, cooperative social norms,
reciprocity and altruism have been shown to affect effort choices in teams.
The role of social pressure in teamwork is discussed by Kandel and Lazear
(1992). Rotemberg (1994) shows that altruism can improve team outcomes
when workers’ payments depend only on their joint output.
Could it be that our findings stem from social preferences instead of
self-confidence? Our experimental design rules out most of these alternative
explanations. Players never know the identity of their partners and so no peer
pressure can be exert in teams. Moreover, we use a perfect stranger matching
design so that there are no repeated interactions between players. That rules
out the establishment of cooperative social norms. Similarly, we believe that
reciprocity cannot explain our results since players make simultaneous effort
decisions, which reduces the scope for reciprocity concerns to play a role.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that altruism is an alternative
explanation for the behavior of overconfident players (but is inconsistent with
the behavior of underconfident players).
In the experiment, players are divided into two types according to their
relative performance within a pair. In other words, the assignment of subjects
to types is based on performance in a randomly drawn pair and not on a
population ranking among the 20 participants in each session. Consequently,
some players can be assigned to low types while their population rank is above
median and others can be assigned to high types while their population rank
is below median. In fact, we find that 27% of participants (32 subjects)
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are not assigned to the same type when we compare the assignment rule
based on relative performance within a pair to the assignment rule based
on population ranking among the 20 participants in each session. To make
sure our findings do not depend on the way types are assigned, we perform
the full analysis only for players who are assigned the same type whatever
the assignment rule (the estimations are available upon request). We find
essentially the same results. Hence, the assignment process does not seem to
affect substantially our results.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates experimentally the impact of agents’ self-perceptions
of skill on team performance. Teamwork is well known to lead to a free riding
problem and inefficient production levels. However, previous research shows
that psychological characteristics of agents like altruism and reciprocity can
improve team outcomes.
We find that, all else equal, overconfident players provide higher effort
levels than unbiased players. We also find empirical support for a strategic
effect of overconfidence in that players put more effort when their team part-
ner is overconfident rather than unbiased. As a consequence, the presence of
overconfident players in teams leads to higher production levels. Addition-
ally we find that overconfidence has no significant effect on an overconfident
player’s payoff and it raises the payoff of the team partners. Therefore, over-
confidence generates a Pareto improvement. In contrast, underconfidence
reduces players’ efforts, team production and players’ payoffs.
Our results show that the presence of overconfident workers in teams is
beneficial for firms since it improves team production. Additionally, the find-
ings also show that this can also be beneficial for workers since overconfidence
does not damage overconfident workers’ payoffs and improves the payoffs of
their team partners. This advocates a hiring policy in which managers of
firms take into account the employees’ self-confidence in order to set up more
efficient teams.
This first empirical study on self-perceptions and teamwork opens the
door for further research. It would be interesting to run a similar experiment
with a real effort task. Since real effort is typically hard to measure it would
not be possible to test for direct and strategic effects of self-confidence on
effort. However, it would still be possible to find out if overconfident teams
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do better than unbiased teams and to study the effects of self-confidence on
players’ payoffs.
Our experimental design does not test all predictions in Gervais and Gold-
stein (2007). In particular, what are the implications of overconfidence for
leadership in teams? Are overconfident people better leaders than those who
evaluate their skills correctly? The impact of self-confidence on team output
might also matter for endogenous team formation. Do people prefer to work
with overconfident or unbiased partners? If people can exclude someone from
a team, are underconfident workers more likely to be excluded than others?
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Tables
Table 1: Sample Characteristics
Full Treatment Treatment
Sample “Belief” “Type and Belief”
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Gender 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.49
Age 22.14 4.62 21.52 2.00 22.77 6.11
Marital status 0.08 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22
Student 0.92 0.28 0.92 0.28 0.92 0.28
Years of education 3.13 1.33 2.92 1.23 3.35 1.41
Field of study 0.76 0.43 0.80 0.40 0.72 0.45
Children 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Years of education of mother 2.69 1.70 2.72 1.78 2.67 1.63
Years of education of father 3.43 2.06 3.18 1.97 3.68 2.13
Participation in experiments 0.93 0.25 0.93 0.25 0.93 0.25
Observations 120 60 60
Note. Gender is 0 if male and 1 if female. Marital status is 0 if single and 1 if couple. Student is 1 if student
and 0 otherwise. Years of education is 1 if complete secondary school, 2 if you have 2 years of university, 3
if three years at university, 4 if four years, 5 if five years, and 6 if six or more years of university. Field of
study is 1 if economics and management and 0 otherwise. Children is 1 if at least one child and 0 otherwise.
Participation in experiments is 1 if previously participated and 0 if not.
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Self-Confidence Biases
Skill Belief Players Proportion
High Unbiased 38 31.67%
Full Underconfident 22 18.33%
Sample Low Unbiased 28 23.33%
Overconfident 32 26.67%
High Unbiased 18 30.00%
Treatment Underconfident 12 20.00%
“Belief” Low Unbiased 15 25.00%
Overconfident 15 25.00%
High Unbiased 20 33.33%
Treatment Underconfident 10 16.67%
“Type and Belief” Low Unbiased 13 21.67%
Overconfident 17 28.33%
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Table 3: Set of BNE Effort Levels, Γ(q1, q2)
Player 2
q2 ≤ 0.5 q2 ≥ 0.5
Player 1
q1 ≤ 0.5 {(6,6),(8,6),(6,8), {(6,8),(8,8),(8,10),(8,8),(10,10)} (10,10),(10,12)}
q1 ≥ 0.5 {(8,6),(8,8),(10,8), {(8,8),(10,10),(12,10),(10,10),(12,10)} (10,12),(12,12)}
Table 4: Teams that Play a BNE as a Function of Skills and Beliefs
Low-Skill Mixed-Skill High-Skill Total
Player i underconfident 16/29 16/29
Player j underconfident (0.55) (0.55)
Player i underconfident 33/74 36/96 69/170
Player j unbiased (0.45) (0.37) (0.41)
Player i unbiased 28/42 54/122 74/85 156/249
Player j unbiased (0.67) (0.44) (0.87) (0.63)
Player i underconfident 39/80 39/80
Player j overconfident (0.49) (0.49)
Player i unbiased 44/112 89/144 133/256
Player j overconfident (0.39) (0.62) (0.52)
Player i overconfident 21/56 21/56
Player j overconfident (0.37) (0.37)
Total 93/210 215/420 126/210 434/840
(0.44) (0.51) (0.60) (0.52)
Note. In parentheses is the proportion of teams that play a BNE for each team com-
position.
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Table 5: Distribution of Effort as a Function of Skills and Beliefs
Team partner’s belief
Low High
Effort 6 8 10 12 6 8 10 12
Low- Unbiased 0.39 0.42 0.13 0.06 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.22
Skill Overconfident 0.14 0.20 0.43 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.29 0.41
Player
High- Unbiased 0.07 0.18 0.47 0.28 0.03 0.11 0.32 0.54
Skill Underconfident 0.33 0.23 0.32 0.12 0.26 0.52 0.11 0.11
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Table 6: Regression Results: Individual Effort Choices
Player’s belief 0.946a 0.842a
(0.167) (0.183)
Team partner’s belief 0.352a 0.381a
(0.082) (0.082)
Player’s skill 1.099a 0.950a
(0.205) (0.221)
Team partner’s skill 0.515a 0.542a
(0.103) (0.103)
Overconfident player 0.742a 0.648a
(0.220) (0.236)
Underconfident player -1.152a -1.034a
(0.242) (0.252)
Overconfident team partner 0.175c 0.185c
(0.098) (0.097)
Underconfident team partner -0.505a -0.550a
(0.102) (0.106)
Gender -0.307c -0.290c
(0.163) (0.163)
Age -0.023b -0.020c
(0.011) (0.011)
Marital status 0.113 0.093
(0.222) (0.218)
Student -0.222 -0.227
(0.259) (0.258)
Years of education -0.027 -0.027
(0.053) (0.053)
Field of study -0.091 -0.125
(0.206) (0.211)
Children -0.945 -0.951
(0.692) (0.710)
Years of education of mother -0.003 0.005
(0.055) (0.055)
Years of education of father 0.054 0.050
(0.041) (0.041)
Participation in experiments -0.171 -0.202
(0.304) (0.293)
Observations 1680 1680 1680 1680
Subjects 120 120 120 120
Log-likelihood -2132.069 -2097.885 -2107.988 -2076.584
Chi squared 45.56 62.05 69.40 81.11
Prob>Chi Squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R squared 0.0712 0.0861 0.0817 0.0954
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c indicate signif-
icance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Mean Team Output as a Function of Team Skills, Beliefs, and Compli-
ance with BNE.
Low-Skill Mixed-Skill High-Skill
Player i underconfident 882
Player j underconfident (29)
Player i underconfident 664 986
Player j unbiased (74) (96)
Player i unbiased 422 792 1231
Player j unbiased (42) (122) (85)
Player i underconfident 684
Player j overconfident (80)
Player i unbiased 538 890
Player j overconfident (112) (144)
Player i overconfident 563
Player j overconfident (56)
Total 521 783 1071
(210) (420) (210)
Note. In parentheses is the number of teams in each category.
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Table 8: Regression Results: Team Output
Low-Skill Teams Mixed-Skill Teams High-Skill Teams
Intercept 421.714a 529.633a 792.541a 871.042a 1230.847a 835.461a
(11.825) (72.069) (13.474) (58.573) (14.478) (257.093)
Two under -349.054a -366.577a
(40.107) (40.564)
One under -127.946a -124.950a -245.118a -257.259a
(21.495) (21.611) (22.641) (24.202)
Two over 141.321a 111.992a
(19.719) (24.235)
One over 117a 97.490a 97.709a 82.618a
(16.140) (17.225) (18.803) (20.177)
Two biased -108.366a -108.134a
(19.111) (19.654)
Mixed gender -21.274 -46.204b 22.338
(24.183) (19.500) (25.173)
Female gender -37.335 -60.520a 19.834
(25.545) (22.805) (35.979)
Age 0.392 -2.250b 4.545
(1.439) (1.103) (6.446)
One married player -42.222c 21.169 -55.538
(22.494) (25.126) (54.614)
Two married players -3.515 -124.564b
(34.085) (49.273)
Student -29.174 -2.881 -15.132
(25.637) (22.784) (43.871)
Players’ years of education -7.347 1.502 14.391b
(4.939) (3.574) (6.573)
No student in economics -69.159 38.417 -31.850
(48.309) (30.823) (41.307)
One student in economics 16.461 20.037 34.318
(17.685) (15.627) (23.422)
Child -57.065 -35.380
(36.657) (52.805)
Mothers’ years of education -2.486 2.680 4.819
(3.463) (3.634) (6.050)
Fathers’ years of education -3.282 4.361 10.930b
(2.770) (2.991) (4.559)
Participation in experiment -13.096 -15.507 40.891
(21.343) (22.903) (35.548)
Observations 210 210 420 420 210 210
F 36.10 8.18 55.53 14.75 78.93 19.74
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R squared 0.1795 0.2593 0.2816 0.3166 0.4196 0.4949
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 9: Mean individual payoff as a function of players’ skill, belief, and partners’
skill and belief
Team partner’s skill and belief
Low-Skill High-Skill
Unbiased Overconfident Unbiased Underconfident
Low- Unbiased 119 148 271 235
skill Overconfident 126 140 278 203
Player
High- Unbiased 246 280 430 338
Skill Underconfident 217 245 381 329
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Table 10: Regression Results: Individual Payoffs
Intercept 119.51a 86.04a
(3.56) (12.40)
Player’s skill 133.93a 136.30a
(4.41) (4.24)
Team partner’s skill 164.14a 163.88a
(3.07) (3.11)
Overconfident player -3.89 -3.05
(4.32) (4.38)
Underconfident player -33.26a -35.18a
(4.54) (4.70)
Overconfident team partner 26.26a 25.93a
(3.61) (3.60)
Underconfident team partner -66.53a -66.30a
(5.07) (5.11)
Gender 4.31
(3.20)
Age 0.72a
(0.22)
Marital status -12.08a
(3.02)
Student 2.36
(5.12)
Years of education 2.53b
(1.12)
Field of study -3.92
(3.44)
Children 12.33
(10.25)
Years of education of mother 0.40
(0.97)
Years of education of father 0.04
(0.92)
Participation in experiments 7.10
(5.65)
Observations 1680 1680
Subjects 120 120
F 760.96 338.80
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000
R squared 0.7568 0.7594
Note. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Superscripts
a, b and c indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, re-
spectively.
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Appendix A: Gervais and Goldstein (2007)’s
Model
According to Gervais and Goldstein (2007) team output generates from a
single one-period project, which can either succeed, with probability pi, or
fail, with probability 1 − pi. The value of the project is the value of its
expected cash flow. The probability of success depends on the agents’ unob-
servable efforts, ei ∈ [0, 1], their abilities, ai ∈ [0, 1], and a synergy effect. In
particular,
pi(e1, e2) = a1e1 + a2e2 + se1e2,
where a1 + a2 + s < 1 so that success probabilities lie in [0, 1], and s > 0
so that agents’ efforts create positive externalities. Agents are risk-neutral.
Their effort decisions are made simultaneously and are unobservable to the
other agent. They sustain a private cost of effort given by c(ei) =
1
2e
2
i . Agent
i chooses effort to maximize expected payoff,
Ui = wi (aiei + ajej + se1e2)− 1
2
e2i , i &= j.
The optimal effort of agent i as a function of agent j’s effort is
ei = wi(ai + sej), i &= j.
The Nash equilibrium effort of agent i is
ei =
wi(ai + swjaj)
1− s2w1w2 . (11)
To introduce overconfidence, Gervais and Goldstein (2007) assume that agent
2 suffers from a self-perception bias, thinking that he is more skilled than
he really is, and therefore overestimates the contribution of his effort to the
project’s chance of success. Specifically, agent 2 thinks his ability is A2 ≥ a2,
although it is actually only a2.
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) denote the agent’s self-perception bias by
b2 = A2 − a2 ∈ [0, 1 − a1 − a2 − s). They assume that agent 1 knows that
agent 2 is biased, agent 2 is unaware of his own bias, and agent 2 knows that
agent 1 thinks 2 is biased but disagrees with 1. This implies that agent 2
chooses effort to maximize
U2 = w2 [a1e1 + (a2 + b2)e2 + se1e2]− 1
2
e22.
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From this, it is easy to show that agent 1 and agent 2 choose
e1 = w1(a1 + se2),
e2 = w2(a2 + b2 + se1).
The Nash equilibrium effort levels are
e1 =
w1(a1 + sw2a2)
1− s2w1w2 +
b2sw1w2
1− s2w1w2 ,
e2 =
w2 (a2 + sw1a1)
1− s2w1w2 +
b2w2
1− s2w1w2 . (12)
From (11) and (12) we can see that agents’ efforts are higher when agent 2 is
overconfident than when agent 2 is unbiased. We also see that agents’ efforts
are increasing with overconfidence.
Appendix B: Derivations
Using the equilibrium effort levels e1 and e2 determined by (3), the ex-post
payoff of player 1 is equal to
Uˆ1(b¯1, b¯2) = w
[
a1e1(b¯1, b¯2) + a2e2(b¯1, b¯2) + se1(b¯1, b¯2)e2(b¯1, b¯2)
]−c [e1(b¯1, b¯2)]2 .
If player 1 is unbiased (b¯1 = 0) and player 2 is overconfident (b¯2 > 0), then
the impact of b¯2 on Uˆ1 is given by
∂Uˆ1
∂b¯2
=
∂Uˆ1
∂e2
∂e2
∂b¯2
+
∂Uˆ1
∂e1
∂e1
∂b¯2
= w (a2 + se1)
∂e2
∂b¯2
+ w(a1 + se2)
∂e1
∂b¯2
− 2ce1∂e1
∂b¯2
=
2cw2 (a2 + se1) + sw3(a1 + se2)− 2ce1sw2
z
=
2cw2a2 + sw3(a1 + se2)
z
> 0
Hence, if agent 1 is unbiased and agent 2 is overconfident, then an increase
in overconfidence of agent 2 increases the ex-post payoff of agent 1. Obviously,
the reverse happens if agent 1 is unbiased and agent 2 is underconfident.
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If player 1 is overconfident (b¯1 > 0) and player 2 is unbiased (b¯2 = 0),
then the impact of b¯1 on Uˆ1 is given by
∂Uˆ1
∂b¯1
=
∂Uˆ1
∂e1
∂e1
∂b¯1
+
∂Uˆ1
∂e2
∂e2
∂b¯1
= w(a1 + se2)
∂e1
∂b¯1
− 2ce1∂e1
∂b¯1
+ w(a2 + se1)
∂e2
∂b¯1
=
2cw2(a1 + se2)− 4c2we1 + sw3a2 + s2e1w3
z
=
w [2cw(a1 + se2) + sw2a2 − ze1]
z
This is positive if
2cw(a1 + se2) + sw
2a2 > ze1.
We know that e1 = 2
cw
z a¯1 +
sw2
z a¯2 + 2
cw
z b¯1. So, the inequality becomes
2cwa1 + 2cwe2 + sw
2a2 > 2cwa¯1 + sw
2a¯2 + 2cwb¯1
or
2ca1 + 2cse2 + swa2 > 2ca¯1 + swa¯2 + 2cb¯1
or
b¯1 < se2 + (a1 − a¯1) + sw
2c
(a2 − a¯2)
Substituting e2 = 2
cw
z a¯2 +
sw2
z a¯1 +
sw2
z b¯1 we obtain
zb¯1 < 2cwa¯2 + s
2w2a¯1 + s
2w2b¯1 + za1 − za¯1 + zsw
2c
(a2 − a¯2)
(4c2 − 2s2w2)b¯1 < sw
(
2c− z
2c
)
a¯2 + za1 − (4c2 − 2s2w2)a¯1 + zsw
2c
a2
(4c2 − 2s2w2)b¯1 < s
3w3
2c
(a¯2 − a2) + z(a1 − a¯1) + s2w2a¯1 + 2swca2
b¯1 <
s3w3
2c (a¯2 − a2) + z(a1 − a¯1) + s2w2a¯1 + 2swca2
4c2 − 2s2w2
Hence, if agent 1 is overconfident and agent 2 is unbiased, then an increase
in overconfidence of agent 1 increases the ex-post payoff of agent 1 if and only
if overconfidence is not too extreme.
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If player 1 is underconfident (b¯1 < 0) and player 2 is unbiased (b¯2 = 0),
then the impact of b¯1 on Uˆ1 is given by
∂Uˆ1
∂b¯1
=
∂Uˆ1
∂e1
∂e1
∂b¯1
+
∂Uˆ1
∂e2
∂e2
∂b¯1
= w(a1 + se2)
∂e1
∂b¯1
− 2ce1∂e1
∂b¯1
+ w(a2 + se1)
∂e2
∂b¯1
=
−2cw2(a1 + se2) + 4c2we1 − sw3a2 − s2e1w3
z
= −w [2cw(a1 + se2) + sw
2a2 + ze1]
z
< 0
Hence, if agent 1 is underconfident and agent 2 is unbiased, then an
increase in underconfidence of agent 1 reduces the ex-post payoff of agent 1.
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Appendix C: Experimental Materials
You are involved in an experiment organized by GATE laboratory. During
this experiment, you will earn some money. Your monetary earnings depend
on your decisions and other participants with which you will interact.
Timing of the experimental session
The experiment includes three parts.
In each part, you obtain a score for your decisions. Your score is measured
in points. Your score in each part is revealed to you only at the end of the
experiment. Your final earnings are equal to the sum of scores that you
will obtain in the three parts. Your final earnings are measured in points.
At the end of the experiment, they will be converted into Euros according to
the following rate:
35 points = 1 Euro
In addition, you will receive a 2 Euros show-up fee for participating in this
experiment. Your final earnings will be paid to you in cash in a separate
room before you leave the laboratory.
The instructions related to the first part are described below. The instruc-
tions for the next parts will be distributed later on.
Timing of the first part
The first part includes a preliminary task. We inform you that the score
you will obtain in the preliminary task would, amongst other factors, deter-
mine how easy it will be for you to obtain some points later in the experiment.
More precisely, the more points you obtain in the task, the easier it
will be to obtain points in the third part of the experiment.
What is the preliminary task?
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The preliminary task consists in choosing two integers such as their
sum is equal to the number to calculate. During the task, your screen
is as follows:
In this example, the number to calculate is 27. The number to calculate is
always shown on the top of your screen. To achieve the number to calculate
you have to choose two integers among the ten shown, such as their sum is
equal to the number to calculate. In the previous example, you can choose
the integers 11 and 16 since their sum is equal to the number to calculate
(11+16=27). Several answers can be correct, but you have to choose only
one.
You have 5 minutes to solve as many calculation problems as possible in
a series. The calculation problems are randomly generated for five minutes.
All the subjects are confronted with the same series of calculation problems.
The calculation problems are shown one after another on your screen. You
have to check off the two integers you choose and click on OK-button to val-
idate your answer. You are not told whether your answer is correct
or wrong. Every time that you click on OK-button, you go to the next
calculation problem whatever your answer is.
What is your score in the first part?
Each correct answer gives you 2 points. The wrong answers do not lead to a
loss of points. Thus your score in the preliminary task is equal to the number
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of correct answers you provide multiplied by 2. Your score in the task will
be revealed to you only at the end of the experiment.
We remind you that your score in the task would, amongst other factors,
determine how easy it will be for you to obtain some points later in the ex-
periment.
Before performing the task, you are kindly requested to practice this task for
one minute. During this practice period, the number of correct answers you
provide is not taken into account for your score.
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.
Communication between participants is forbidden throughout the session.
Timing of the second part
The second part includes a self-evaluation question. At the beginning of
part 2, the computer program compares the participants two by two and as-
signs them to a type (Type A or Type B). The types are assigned according
to the number of correct answers provided by the two participants in the
preliminary task of part 1. Your decision consists in indicating the type that
you think you are.
How are the types assigned?
The computer program compares the participants two by two. Each par-
ticipant is compared with one and only one other participant. Then the
computer program assigns a type to each of two participants according to
the number of correct answers provided in the preliminary task. The par-
ticipant who provided most correct answers is assigned to a Type A,
while the one who provided least correct answers is assigned to a Type
B. If both participants provided the same number of correct answers, the
computer program decides between them according to the answer time. The
fastest participant is assigned to a Type A, whereas the other to a Type B.
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Your type is not reveal to you.
The self-evaluation question:
Your decision consists in indicating the type that you think you are. You
have to answer the following question:
Do you think to be a participant of Type A or Type B?
You have to enter your answer (A or B) and click on OK-button to validate it.
What is your score in the second part?
If your answer to the self-evaluation question is correct, your score for the
second part is equal to 175 points (i.e. 5 Euros). Conversely, if your answer
to the self-evaluation question is wrong, your score for the second part is
equal to 0 point. Your score in the second part will be revealed to you only
at the end of the experiment.
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.
Timing of the third part
(Treatment “Type and Belief”)
During the third part, you have to make 14 decisions. For each decision,
the computer program randomly matches the participants into pairs. In each
pair, you have to choose a number. In each pair, your score depends on the
numbers that both you and your partner choose and on your type and your
partner’s (A or B).
Your coefficient:
At the beginning of the third part, the computer program gives you a co-
efficient. Your coefficient depends on your type. The participants of
Type A have a high coefficient equal to 7, whereas the participants of
Type B have a low coefficient equal to 3. Your coefficient does not
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change until the end of the experiment. Your coefficient will be revealed to
you only at the end of the experiment.
Your decisions:
You have to make 14 decisions. For each decision, you are matched with
one out of the 19 participants in the room. The pairs are changed for each
decision such that you are never matched twice with the same partici-
pant. Consequently, you will play the game with 14 out of the 19 participants
in the room. In each pair, your decision consists in choosing a number
among the following four: 6, 8, 10 or 12. You have to enter your 14
decisions in a single table and click on OK-button to validate them.
What is your score for each decision?
For each out of the 14 decisions, you get a score. Your score depends on the
numbers chosen by you and your partner (6, 8, 10 et 12) and your coefficients
(A or B). For each decision, the number that you choose has two effects:
• It negatively affects your score:
Your decision is costly. The cost that you bear depends on the number
you choose.
– The higher the number you choose is, the higher the cost you bear
is.
• It positively affects your score and your partner’s:
The total payoff of the pair is equally divided between you and your
partner. The total payoff of the pair depends on your coefficient and
partner’s one, and the numbers that you and your partner choose.
– The higher the numbers that you and your partner choose are, the
higher the total payoff of the pair is.
– The higher your coefficient and partner’s are, the higher the total
payoff of the pair is.
For each decision, your score (in points) is thus calculated by the computer
program as follows:
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* [Total payoff of the pair]
- your cost
To make your 14 decisions, we give you the score tables. These tables show
you your score and your partner’s according to your coefficients (3 or 7) and
the numbers you choose (6, 8, 10 or 12). Be careful: these tables show you
the scores, meaning that the cost you bear has already been deducted from
the total payoff of the pair. These tables are presented on the two sheets
of paper that we gave you with the instructions of part 3. One of the two
sheets shows the score tables if you are assigned to a Type B and the other if
you are assigned to a Type A. Each of these two sheets includes two tables.
The first table shows you the scores if your partner is assigned to a Type B.
The second table shows you the scores if your partner is assigned to a Type A.
How do you read these tables:
Assume that you are a participant of Type B and your partner also is a par-
ticipant of Type B. Your coefficient and your partner’s are equal to 3. Table
1 shows you your score and your partner’s according to the numbers that
you choose (6, 8, 10 or 12). In each cell of the table, the score written at the
bottom, on the left and in bold is yours, while the score written at the top
on the right is the one of your partner. The scores are indicated in points.
- If you and your partner choose number 6, your score and your partner’s
are equal to 99 points.
- If you choose number 6 and your partner choose number 8, your score is
equal to 132 points and the one of your partner is equal to 90 points.
- If you choose number 10 and your partner choose number 8, your score is
equal to 112 points and the one of your partner is equal to 166 points.
Available information when you are making your decisions:
[The alternative instructions for treatment “Belief” are provided in brackets]
When you are making your 14 decisions, you do not know your type [Treat-
ment “Belief”: When you are making your 14 decisions, you know neither
your type nor your partner’s one]. During the second part of the experiment,
each participant answered the self-evaluation question. Thus, each partici-
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pant indicated which type he thinks he is (A or B). When you are making
your decisions, we remind you your self-evaluation. Moreover, for each of
the 14 decisions we tell you the type and the self-evaluation of your partner
[Treatment “Belief”: Moreover, for each out of the 14 decisions we tell you
the self-evaluation of your partner]. Consequently, you know the type of your
partner, but not yours. Symmetrically, your partner knows your type, but
not his. Since your partner does not know his type when he is making his
decision, we tell you his self-evaluation. So you know which type your part-
ner thinks he is [Treatment “Belief”: those four last sentences are not in the
instructions]. During the decision stage, you will see the following screen:
We remind you the type (A or B) that you think you are. This information is
the same for the 14 decisions. On the other hand, the other informations can
change from one decision to another since they concern your partners and
the pairs are different for each decision. For each of the 14 decisions, the first
column of table shows you the type of your partner [Treatment “Belief”: this
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sentence is not in the instructions]. The second column [Treatment “Belief”:
the first column] shows you the self-evaluation of your partner. So, we tell
you the type that your partner thinks he is. The 14 decisions are randomly
ordered in the decision table. For each decision, you have to choose a number
among 4 possible choices (6, 8, 10 or 12) and enter your decision in the third
column [Treatment “Belief”: in the second column]. After making your 14
decisions, you have to validate them by clicking on OK-button.
What is your score in the third part?
The third part includes 14 decisions. For each decision, you get a score. At
the end of the experimental session, the computer program randomly draws
one decision for each participant. The random draw is such that the same
decision is drawn for you and your partner. Your score in part 3 is equal
to the score you get for the randomly drawn decision.
In order to become familiar with the score tables, you have to complete some
exercises that we are going to give you. If you have some difficulties for using
the score tables, please raise your hand and we will come to help you.
At the end of the experiment, you have to complete a final questionnaire by
following the instructions on your screen. This questionnaire allows you to
get an additional gain that will be added to your final earnings.
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.
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You are a participant of “Type B”
Your coefficient is equal to 3
If your partner is a participant of “Type B”.
His coefficient is equal to 3 and the payoff table is:
Your partner
6 8 10 12
You
6
99 90 69 36
99 132 165 198
8
132 128 112 84
90 128 166 204
10
165 166 155 132
69 112 155 198
12
198 204 198 180
36 84 132 180
Table 1
If your partner is a participant of “Type A”.
His coefficient is equal to 7 and the payoff table is:
Your partner
6 8 10 12
You
6
171 186 189 180
171 228 285 342
8
204 224 232 228
162 224 286 348
10
237 262 275 276
141 208 275 342
12
270 300 318 324
108 180 252 324
Table 2
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You are a participant of “Type A”
Your coefficient is equal to 7
If your partner is a participant of “Type B”.
His coefficient is equal to 3 and the payoff table is:
Your partner
6 8 10 12
You
6
171 162 141 108
171 204 237 270
8
228 224 208 180
186 224 262 300
10
285 286 275 252
189 232 275 318
12
342 348 342 324
180 228 276 324
Table 3
If your partner is a participant of “Type A”.
His coefficient is equal to 7 and the payoff table is:
Your partner
6 8 10 12
You
6
243 258 261 252
243 300 357 414
8
300 320 328 324
258 320 382 444
10
357 382 395 396
261 328 395 462
12
414 444 462 468
252 324 396 468
Table 4
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